Skip to content
Okta vs Entra

Reviewed 10 November 2026

Tokens, assertions and signing keys: what an identity provider must protect

Reviewed 2026-11-10 · Editorial assessment by the editors

By the editors · 3 min read

After sign-in, access runs on tokens: SAML assertions and ID tokens say who the user is, and access tokens say what an app or agent may call. They are only as safe as the key that signs them and the time they stay valid. NIST IR 8587, final on 15 September 2026, is the current federal guidance on protecting them.

Which tokens does an identity provider issue?

A SAML assertion or an OpenID Connect ID token tells an application who the user is. An OAuth access token lets an application or an AI agent call an API or a tool on the user's behalf. A refresh token lets a client get new access tokens without a new sign-in. Each is issued by the identity provider or authorization server, and each is valid for a set time.

How are tokens attacked?

In two main ways. Forgery: someone who obtains the signing key creates new, valid tokens for any user; with SAML this is called Golden SAML. Theft and replay: someone copies a valid token or session and uses it until it expires, without needing the password or MFA. The title of NIST IR 8587 names three threats: forgery, theft and misuse.

What reduces the risk?

  • Protect the signing key. NewCore states that its Secure Split Key distributes signing authority between its cloud and the customer's environment.
  • Keep lifetimes short. Microsoft lists configurable token lifetime policies per application as generally available in April 2026, and the MCP authorization spec says authorization servers should issue short-lived access tokens.
  • Bind tokens to their audience. Under the MCP spec, clients name the target server with an RFC 8707 resource indicator, and servers must reject tokens not issued for them.
  • Re-evaluate during the session. The Shared Signals Framework and CAEP let providers send session and risk changes, and the OpenID Foundation says NIST IR 8587 recommends both.

How short should token lifetimes be?

No single number fits every app, and neither the NIST IR 8587 abstract nor the vendors on this site publish one. The trade-off is fixed: a shorter lifetime narrows the window for a stolen token, and a longer one means fewer prompts for users. Microsoft lists configurable token lifetime policies for access, ID and SAML tokens per application as generally available in April 2026, so the setting can differ by app. Record the lifetimes you run today, then shorten them first for the apps that hold the most sensitive data.

Where does this matter on this site?

The note on NIST IR 8587 turns these points into questions for vendors, and the conditional access comparison covers how Okta and Entra ID re-evaluate access.

Next lesson: Reading pricing pages